2017-07-14 20:41:49 +02:00
# frozen_string_literal: true
# Implemented according to HTTP signatures (Draft 6)
# <https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-cavage-http-signatures-06>
module SignatureVerification
extend ActiveSupport :: Concern
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include DomainControlHelper
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
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EXPIRATION_WINDOW_LIMIT = 12 . hours
CLOCK_SKEW_MARGIN = 1 . hour
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def require_account_signature!
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render json : signature_verification_failure_reason , status : signature_verification_failure_code unless signed_request_account
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end
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def require_actor_signature!
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render json : signature_verification_failure_reason , status : signature_verification_failure_code unless signed_request_actor
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end
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def signed_request?
request . headers [ 'Signature' ] . present?
end
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def signature_verification_failure_reason
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@signature_verification_failure_reason
end
def signature_verification_failure_code
@signature_verification_failure_code || 401
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end
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def signature_key_id
signature_params [ 'keyId' ]
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rescue Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
nil
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end
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def signed_request_account
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signed_request_actor . is_a? ( Account ) ? signed_request_actor : nil
end
def signed_request_actor
return @signed_request_actor if defined? ( @signed_request_actor )
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Request not signed' unless signed_request?
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Incompatible request signature. keyId and signature are required' if missing_required_signature_parameters?
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Unsupported signature algorithm (only rsa-sha256 and hs2019 are supported)' unless %w( rsa-sha256 hs2019 ) . include? ( signature_algorithm )
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Signed request date outside acceptable time window' unless matches_time_window?
2017-07-14 20:41:49 +02:00
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
verify_signature_strength!
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verify_body_digest!
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actor = actor_from_key_id ( signature_params [ 'keyId' ] )
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Public key not found for key #{ signature_params [ 'keyId' ] } " if actor . nil?
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signature = Base64 . decode64 ( signature_params [ 'signature' ] )
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compare_signed_string = build_signed_string ( include_query_string : true )
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return actor unless verify_signature ( actor , signature , compare_signed_string ) . nil?
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# Compatibility quirk with older Mastodon versions
compare_signed_string = build_signed_string ( include_query_string : false )
return actor unless verify_signature ( actor , signature , compare_signed_string ) . nil?
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actor = stoplight_wrapper . run { actor_refresh_key! ( actor ) }
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Could not refresh public key #{ signature_params [ 'keyId' ] } " if actor . nil?
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compare_signed_string = build_signed_string ( include_query_string : true )
return actor unless verify_signature ( actor , signature , compare_signed_string ) . nil?
# Compatibility quirk with older Mastodon versions
compare_signed_string = build_signed_string ( include_query_string : false )
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return actor unless verify_signature ( actor , signature , compare_signed_string ) . nil?
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fail_with! " Verification failed for #{ actor . to_log_human_identifier } #{ actor . uri } using rsa-sha256 (RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 with SHA-256) " , signed_string : compare_signed_string , signature : signature_params [ 'signature' ]
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rescue Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError = > e
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fail_with! e . message
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rescue * Mastodon :: HTTP_CONNECTION_ERRORS = > e
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fail_with! " Failed to fetch remote data: #{ e . message } "
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rescue Mastodon :: UnexpectedResponseError
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fail_with! 'Failed to fetch remote data (got unexpected reply from server)'
rescue Stoplight :: Error :: RedLight
fail_with! 'Fetching attempt skipped because of recent connection failure'
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end
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def request_body
@request_body || = request . raw_post
end
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private
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def fail_with! ( message , ** options )
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Rails . logger . debug { " Signature verification failed: #{ message } " }
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@signature_verification_failure_reason = { error : message } . merge ( options )
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@signed_request_actor = nil
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end
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
def signature_params
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@signature_params || = SignatureParser . parse ( request . headers [ 'Signature' ] )
rescue SignatureParser :: ParsingError
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Error parsing signature parameters'
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
end
def signature_algorithm
signature_params . fetch ( 'algorithm' , 'hs2019' )
end
def signed_headers
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signature_params . fetch ( 'headers' , signature_algorithm == 'hs2019' ? '(created)' : 'date' ) . downcase . split
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
end
def verify_signature_strength!
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Mastodon requires the Date header or (created) pseudo-header to be signed' unless signed_headers . include? ( 'date' ) || signed_headers . include? ( '(created)' )
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Mastodon requires the Digest header or (request-target) pseudo-header to be signed' unless signed_headers . include? ( HttpSignatureDraft :: REQUEST_TARGET ) || signed_headers . include? ( 'digest' )
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Mastodon requires the Host header to be signed when doing a GET request' if request . get? && ! signed_headers . include? ( 'host' )
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Mastodon requires the Digest header to be signed when doing a POST request' if request . post? && ! signed_headers . include? ( 'digest' )
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
end
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def verify_body_digest!
return unless signed_headers . include? ( 'digest' )
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Digest header missing' unless request . headers . key? ( 'Digest' )
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digests = request . headers [ 'Digest' ] . split ( ',' ) . map { | digest | digest . split ( '=' , 2 ) } . map { | key , value | [ key . downcase , value ] }
sha256 = digests . assoc ( 'sha-256' )
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Mastodon only supports SHA-256 in Digest header. Offered algorithms: #{ digests . map ( & :first ) . join ( ', ' ) } " if sha256 . nil?
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return if body_digest == sha256 [ 1 ]
digest_size = begin
Base64 . strict_decode64 ( sha256 [ 1 ] . strip ) . length
rescue ArgumentError
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Invalid Digest value. The provided Digest value is not a valid base64 string. Given digest: #{ sha256 [ 1 ] } "
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end
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Invalid Digest value. The provided Digest value is not a SHA-256 digest. Given digest: #{ sha256 [ 1 ] } " if digest_size != 32
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Invalid Digest value. Computed SHA-256 digest: #{ body_digest } ; given: #{ sha256 [ 1 ] } "
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end
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def verify_signature ( actor , signature , compare_signed_string )
if actor . keypair . public_key . verify ( OpenSSL :: Digest . new ( 'SHA256' ) , signature , compare_signed_string )
@signed_request_actor = actor
@signed_request_actor
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end
rescue OpenSSL :: PKey :: RSAError
nil
end
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def build_signed_string ( include_query_string : true )
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
signed_headers . map do | signed_header |
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case signed_header
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when HttpSignatureDraft :: REQUEST_TARGET
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if include_query_string
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" #{ HttpSignatureDraft :: REQUEST_TARGET } : #{ request . method . downcase } #{ request . original_fullpath } "
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else
# Current versions of Mastodon incorrectly omit the query string from the (request-target) pseudo-header.
# Therefore, temporarily support such incorrect signatures for compatibility.
# TODO: remove eventually some time after release of the fixed version
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" #{ HttpSignatureDraft :: REQUEST_TARGET } : #{ request . method . downcase } #{ request . path } "
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end
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when '(created)'
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Invalid pseudo-header (created) for rsa-sha256' unless signature_algorithm == 'hs2019'
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Pseudo-header (created) used but corresponding argument missing' if signature_params [ 'created' ] . blank?
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
" (created): #{ signature_params [ 'created' ] } "
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when '(expires)'
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Invalid pseudo-header (expires) for rsa-sha256' unless signature_algorithm == 'hs2019'
raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , 'Pseudo-header (expires) used but corresponding argument missing' if signature_params [ 'expires' ] . blank?
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
" (expires): #{ signature_params [ 'expires' ] } "
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else
" #{ signed_header } : #{ request . headers [ to_header_name ( signed_header ) ] } "
end
end . join ( " \n " )
end
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def matches_time_window?
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
created_time = nil
expires_time = nil
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begin
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
if signature_algorithm == 'hs2019' && signature_params [ 'created' ] . present?
created_time = Time . at ( signature_params [ 'created' ] . to_i ) . utc
elsif request . headers [ 'Date' ] . present?
created_time = Time . httpdate ( request . headers [ 'Date' ] ) . utc
end
expires_time = Time . at ( signature_params [ 'expires' ] . to_i ) . utc if signature_params [ 'expires' ] . present?
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rescue ArgumentError = > e
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Invalid Date header: #{ e . message } "
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end
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
expires_time || = created_time + 5 . minutes unless created_time . nil?
expires_time = [ expires_time , created_time + EXPIRATION_WINDOW_LIMIT ] . min unless created_time . nil?
return false if created_time . present? && created_time > Time . now . utc + CLOCK_SKEW_MARGIN
return false if expires_time . present? && Time . now . utc > expires_time + CLOCK_SKEW_MARGIN
true
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end
2017-08-09 23:54:14 +02:00
def body_digest
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@body_digest || = Digest :: SHA256 . base64digest ( request_body )
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end
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def to_header_name ( name )
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name . split ( '-' ) . map ( & :capitalize ) . join ( '-' )
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end
Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft (#14556)
* Add support for latest HTTP Signatures spec draft
https://www.ietf.org/id/draft-ietf-httpbis-message-signatures-00.html
- add support for the “hs2019” signature algorithm (assumed to be equivalent
to RSA-SHA256, since we do not have a mechanism to specify the algorithm
within the key metadata yet)
- add support for (created) and (expires) pseudo-headers and related
signature parameters, when using the hs2019 signature algorithm
- adjust default “headers” parameter while being backwards-compatible with
previous implementation
- change the acceptable time window logic from 12 hours surrounding the “date”
header to accepting signatures created up to 1 hour in the future and
expiring up to 1 hour in the past (but only allowing expiration dates up to
12 hours after the creation date)
This doesn't conform with the current draft, as it doesn't permit accounting
for clock skew.
This, however, should be addressed in a next version of the draft:
https://github.com/httpwg/http-extensions/pull/1235
* Add additional signature requirements
* Rewrite signature params parsing using Parslet
* Make apparent which signature algorithm Mastodon on verification failure
Mastodon uses RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5, which is not recommended for new applications,
and new implementers may thus unknowingly use RSASSA-PSS.
* Add workaround for PeerTube's invalid signature header
The previous parser allowed incorrect Signature headers, such as
those produced by old versions of the `http-signature` node.js package,
and seemingly used by PeerTube.
This commit adds a workaround for that.
* Fix `signature_key_id` raising an exception
Previously, parsing failures would result in `signature_key_id` being nil,
but the parser changes made that result in an exception.
This commit changes the `signature_key_id` method to return `nil` in case
of parsing failures.
* Move extra HTTP signature helper methods to private methods
* Relax (request-target) requirement to (request-target) || digest
This lets requests from Plume work without lowering security significantly.
2020-08-24 18:21:07 +02:00
def missing_required_signature_parameters?
signature_params [ 'keyId' ] . blank? || signature_params [ 'signature' ] . blank?
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end
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def actor_from_key_id ( key_id )
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domain = key_id . start_with? ( 'acct:' ) ? key_id . split ( '@' ) . last : key_id
if domain_not_allowed? ( domain )
@signature_verification_failure_code = 403
return
end
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if key_id . start_with? ( 'acct:' )
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stoplight_wrapper . run { ResolveAccountService . new . call ( key_id . delete_prefix ( 'acct:' ) , suppress_errors : false ) }
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elsif ! ActivityPub :: TagManager . instance . local_uri? ( key_id )
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account = ActivityPub :: TagManager . instance . uri_to_actor ( key_id )
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account || = stoplight_wrapper . run { ActivityPub :: FetchRemoteKeyService . new . call ( key_id , suppress_errors : false ) }
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account
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end
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rescue Mastodon :: PrivateNetworkAddressError = > e
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Requests to private network addresses are disallowed (tried to query #{ e . host } ) "
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rescue Mastodon :: HostValidationError , ActivityPub :: FetchRemoteActorService :: Error , ActivityPub :: FetchRemoteKeyService :: Error , Webfinger :: Error = > e
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , e . message
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end
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def stoplight_wrapper
Stoplight ( " source: #{ request . remote_ip } " )
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. with_threshold ( 1 )
. with_cool_off_time ( 5 . minutes . seconds )
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. with_error_handler { | error , handle | error . is_a? ( HTTP :: Error ) || error . is_a? ( OpenSSL :: SSL :: SSLError ) ? handle . call ( error ) : raise ( error ) }
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end
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def actor_refresh_key! ( actor )
return if actor . local? || ! actor . activitypub?
return actor . refresh! if actor . respond_to? ( :refresh! ) && actor . possibly_stale?
ActivityPub :: FetchRemoteActorService . new . call ( actor . uri , only_key : true , suppress_errors : false )
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rescue Mastodon :: PrivateNetworkAddressError = > e
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , " Requests to private network addresses are disallowed (tried to query #{ e . host } ) "
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rescue Mastodon :: HostValidationError , ActivityPub :: FetchRemoteActorService :: Error , Webfinger :: Error = > e
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raise Mastodon :: SignatureVerificationError , e . message
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end
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end